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Abstract 
In sensor networks, nodes cooperatively work to collect data and forward it to the final destination.  
Many protocols have been proposed in the literature to provide routing and secure routing for ad hoc and 
sensor networks, but these protocols either very expensive to be used in very resource-limited 
environments such as sensor networks, or suffer from the lack of one or more security guarantees and 
vulnerable to attacks such as wormhole, Sinkhole, Sybil, blackhole, selective forwarding, rushing, and 
fabricating attacks. In this paper we propose a secure lightweight routing protocol called SRPS. SRPS uses 
symmetric cryptographic entities within the capabilities of the sensors, supports intermediate node 
authentication of the routing information in addition to end-to-end authentication, provides secure 
multiple disjoint paths, and thwarts all the known attacks against routing infrastructure against Byzantine 
cooperative attack model. We analyze the security guarantees of SRPS and use Ns-2 simulations to show 
the effectiveness of SRPS in counter-measuring known attacks against the routing infrastructure. Overhead 
cost analysis is conducted to prove the lightweight-ness of SRPS. 
Keywords: sensor network security, secure routing, symmetric cryptography, multiple disjoint paths, 
neighbor watch, active and passive attacks. 
1 Introduction  
The open nature of the communication media used in wireless ad-hoc and sensor networks, the lack 
of infrastructure, the fast deployment polices, and the hostile environments where they usually deployed 
in, make these networks vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. Of the many areas vulnerable to attacks in 
sensor and ad hoc networks are the routing protocols. Attacks on routing can be external as well as 
internal, and this means that there is a need to come up with schemes to safeguard the routing process.  
Authentication of the routing information by the nodes involved in the route is necessary to prevent this 
information from being fabricated or modified by compromised nodes. Internal attacks on the routing 
infrastructure include Wormhole attack, Rushing attack, Sybil attack, Selective forwarding, Sinkhole 
attack, spoofing, and malicious forge or change of the routing information.  
Due to the constrained resources available to sensor networks, the application of known 
countermeasures used in wired networks will not be applicable. Also, while wireless sensor networks 
share similarities with ad-hoc wireless networks, the dominant communication method on both is multi-
hop; there are several important distinctions. Firstly, ad-hoc networks usually support routing between 
any pair of nodes in the network, whereas sensor networks has a narrower communication pattern in 
which the bulk of the traffic is between a centralized point (called sink or base station) and each sensor in 
the network, and little traffic goes between sensors, usually within the same geographic vicinity for 
coordination and data aggregation. Secondly, the resources in sensor networks (energy, CPU, memory, 
storage, and bandwidth) are far more limited than those of ad-hoc networks. Finally, due to redundancy in 
sensor networks, many neighboring sensors observe the same or correlated environmental events. If every 
one of these events is going to be sent to the base station independently, then precious resources will be 
wasted. Thus, there must be trust relationships among sensors beyond those typically found in ad-hoc 
networks, to cooperate in data aggregation and duplicate elimination to optimize resource usage. 
Contribution: in this paper we present a secure routing protocol for static sensor networks, called 
SRPS that: 
1. Thwarts the internal Byzantine attacks launched by compromised nodes such as wormhole attack, 
Sybil attack, and blackhole attack. 
2. Presents a novel way to provide per-hop authentication of the routing information in addition to the 
end-to-end authentication. 
3. Is lightweight and only uses symmetric key cryptography tools to the extent of sensors capabilities. 
4. Does not require any special hardware (such as directional antennas or GPS). 
5. Does not require any time synchronization among the nodes in the network (neither tight nor loose). 
6. Provides an idea to link short commitment sequences without the need to provide a new commitment 
key when the current commitment sequence is exhausted, this eliminates the need for large 
commitment sequences. 
7. Supports secure multiple-disjoint-path discovery between the two end points of communication.  
Trivial Denial of Service attacks based on interception and non-cooperation exist in all ad hoc routing 
protocols but they are not achieved through subversion of the routing protocols, so they will not be 
considered. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section  2 presents the related work in the field of secure 
routing protocols in wireless ad-hoc and sensor networks. Section  3 describes the SRPS protocol. 
Section  4 presents security analysis of SRPS. Section  5 presents coverage and cost analysis of SRPS. 
Section  6 presents simulation results. Finally, Section  7 concludes the paper. 
 
 
2 Related Work 
 
Many ad-hoc network security mechanisms for authentication and secure routing protocols have been 
proposed in the literature. Some of them are based on local monitoring ( [1] -  [6]), while others are based 
on the public/symmetric key cryptography ([7]- [13]). Those protocols either suffer from weak security 
measures or have a very expensive overhead which sensor networks can not afford. 
Papadimitratos and Haas  [13] present the SRP protocol that is secure against non-colluding 
adversaries by disabling route caching and providing end-to-end authentication using an HMAC 
primitive. SEAD  [10] uses one-way hash chains to provide authentication for DSDV  [27]. Ariadne  [11] 
uses an authenticated broadcast technique  [44] to achieve similar security goals on DSR  [29]. Marti et. 
al.  [34] examine techniques to minimize the effect of misbehaving nodes through node snooping and 
reporting, but it is vulnerable to blackmail attacks. ARRIVE  [31] proposes probabilistic multi-path 
routing instead of single path algorithm to enhance the robustness of routing. These secure routing 
protocols are still vulnerable to wormhole  [48] attacks that can be conducted without having access to any 
cryptographic keys. 
Zhu et. al.  [38] present LHAP, an authentication protocol for ad hoc networks. LHAP is based on a 
hop-by-hop authentication for verifying the authenticity of all the packets transmitted in the network and 
on one-way key chain and TESLA for packet authentication. LHAP uses also asymmetric key 
cryptography to bootstrap trust in the network. All these tools are highly expensive for sensors making 
LHAP infeasible in sensor networks. 
It is usually infeasible to apply the above-mentioned protocols to sensor networks. The public key 
cryptography is far beyond the capabilities of sensor nodes. And the symmetric key protocols proposed 
are too expensive in terms of node state and communication overhead. Many sensor network routing 
protocols have been proposed ( [14],  [15],  [16],  [17],  [18], [19],  [20]) and many secure applications have 
been proposed, but many of them are even more susceptible to attacks against their routing infrastructure. 
These attacks fall into one or more of the following categories: spoofed, altered, or replayed routing 
information, selective forwarding, sinkhole attacks, Sybil attacks, wormholes, HELLO flood attacks, and 
acknowledgement spoofing. 
Karlof and Wagner  [33] analyze the vulnerability of various routing protocols to one or more of the 
above mentioned attacks and provide general framework for countermeasures of these attacks. However, 
they did not propose a secure solution for routing but leave it as an open problem to design a sensor 
network routing protocol that satisfies the security goals they propose. They show that TinyOS beaconing 
suffers from bogus routing information, selective forwarding, sinkholes, Sybil, wormholes, and HELLO 
flood attacks. Directional diffusion  [14] and its multi-path variant  [17] suffer from bogus routing 
information, selective forwarding, sinkholes, Sybil, wormholes, and HELLO flood attacks. Geographical 
routing protocols, GPSR  [16] and GEAR  [18], suffer from bogus routing information, selective 
forwarding, and Sybil attacks. Minimum cost forwarding  [19] suffers from bogus routing information, 
selective forwarding, sinkholes, wormholes, and HELLO flood attacks. Clustering based protocols, 
LEACH  [20], TEEN  [40], PEGASIS  [41], suffer from selective forwarding and HELLO flood attacks. 
Rumor routing  [21] suffers from bogus routing information, selective forwarding, sinkholes, Sybil, and 
wormhole attacks. Wireless reprogramming protocols  ([26] [25]) suffer from high overhead. Other domain 
protocols also (  [42]  [43]) also has high overhead. 
Hu et. al.  [37] describe the rushing attack in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols and propose a 
countermeasure through dynamic secure neighbor detection, secure route delegation, and randomized 
route request forwarding. This protocol depends on a very strict time propagation delay measurement to 
detect neighbors. Neighbor detection is done on the fly and for every packet exchanged which may affect 
the efficiency and the ability of using it in highly constrained sensor networks. Hu and Evans  [36] 
propose a solution to the wormhole attacks using specialized hardware; directional antennas 
TESLA  [28] and µTSLA  [44], use an authentication technique that uses periodic and delayed key 
disclosure. Delayed authentication (as in TESLA, and µTESLA) is not appropriate since a packet would 
be delayed at each node in the path from the source to the destination. Moreover, since each node has to 
buffer the traffic packets it has received until they are authenticated, delayed authentication will lead to 
high storage requirement at every node. However, SRPS uses an authentication technique that does not 
need a large storage by a voiding the pre-computation of a hash sequence of keys and storing them in 
advance for the whole life time of the sensor. Also SRPS authentication doesn’t require any kind of time 
synchronization because the authentication is limited to the neighborhood and all the neighbors receive 
the data at the same time, so there is no chance for any of them to forge messages and broadcast them on 
behalf of the real source.  
Some routing protocols (e.g.  [27],  [29]) use non-repeating increasing counters for the route request 
and route reply packet identifier while others use random numbers (e.g.  [13],  [37]). However, these ways 
for the packet identifier add vulnerabilities to the routing protocol. If an increasing sequence number is 
used, an attacker can track the sequence number of the route requests from any source, say S, to any 
destination, say D, and then launches a DoS attack by flooding the network with a higher number.  This 
will prevent S and D from discovering any new routes between them, since all the nodes in the network 
will think that this is an old request and just drop it. On the other hand, if a random number is used, an 
attacker can easily replay old attacks since the destination can’t distinguish between an old valid request 
and a new one using the random number alone. 
Both of these choices fail to countermeasure the malicious inclusion of compromised nodes in an 
already established route  [39]. The success of this attack facilitates the success of other attacks such as the 
blackhole attacks and the selective forwarding attacks. A compromised node can include itself in an 
already established route by sending a valid route request (correct sequence number or random number) 
to a node already in the route. Figure 1 shows an example of how can a malicious node includes itself in 
an already established route in a protocol like DSDV  [28]. The malicious node, M, sends to Y a route 
request with a source sequence number greater than the current one. In response to that, Y changes the 
route to A to point to M instead of X. Then M sends to X a route reply packet with a destination sequence 
number greater than the current one. X changes its route to B to point to M instead of Y. Thus M succeeds 
in including itself in the route easily. 
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Figure 1: (A) An example of a malicious node broadcasting fabricated route request. (B) The 
route after the malicious node succeeds 
 
To countermeasure this attack, there must exist a method by which an intermediate node can verify 
the authenticity of the route request and the route reply. ARAN  [39] proposes a solution using public key 
cryptography with centralized trusted authority and signatures. The route initiator signs the route request 
packet and every intermediate node verifies the signature of the initiator verifies the signature of the 
previous hop, replaces the signature of the previous hop with its own signature. Ariadne  [11] suggests 
three methods to provide authenticity to the intermediate nodes; using pair-wise symmetric keys in which 
the route request/reply must be individually authenticated to each intermediate node and to 
destination/source, using TESLA protocol which provides authenticate public broadcasting, and uses 
digital signatures. These solutions for intermediate node authentication are very expensive in terms of the 
computational and bandwidth overhead which makes them impractical for a highly limited resources 
sensor networks. 
Neighbor watch has been used as an enhancement of the watch dog approach  [34] , which was used to 
negate the effect on throughput of misbehaving nodes that agree to forward packets but do not. But watch 
dog suffers from problems such as ambiguous collisions and receiver collisions. A malicious watcher 
could blackmail a good node by claiming that it did not forward a packet while it is really did, or it may 
not receive the message due to collision. Another problem could occur when the watcher is not able to 
detect whether the receiver forwards the packet or not if the watcher got jammed by the time when the 
receiver forwards. Neighbor watch mitigates these problems by not limiting the watch to the packets’ 
sender but asking other neighbor nodes to work as watchers. 
3 Description of SRPS 
Overview: Immediately after the deployment of the sensors in the network, the initial phase 
(Section  3.2) starts, this provides each node with a list of neighbors, a commitment key for each neighbor, 
and the neighbors of each neighbors (first and second hop neighbors). This neighbor list is built using 
neighbor detection protocols (Section  3.1). Anode that needs to communication with another node checks 
its routing table; if a route does not exist, it enters a route discovery phase (Section  3.3).  In the route 
discovery phase, the route request initiator floods the network with a route request which propagates to 
the destination. The destination unicasts a route reply back to the initiator which stores the route in its 
routing table, leaves the route discovery phase, and starts using the established route. Each intermediate 
node in path of the route reply verifies the authenticity of the route reply (Section  3.4), updates its routing 
table and forwards the packet to the next hop. Each node that forwards the route request or the route reply 
proves its identity to its neighbors through MAC authentication using its commitment key (Section  3.2). 
Each node that can overhear the route reply monitors the behavior of the nodes involved in forwarding the 
route reply for suspicious actions, such as fabrication, change, or dropping (Section  3.5).  
Some applications (e.g. secure data transmission) require multiple disjoint paths to exist between the 
source and the destination, Section  3.6 explains how SRPS provides disjoint multiple paths. If an 
established route breaks, the first intermediate node that notices the break sends a route error packet back 
to source, in a process called route maintenance (Section  3.7).  
Assumptions: We assume that the links are bi-directional; which means that if a node A can hear 
node B then node B can hear node A. Also we assume the existence of an underlying pair-wise key 
management protocol ( [44],  [45],  [46]). Any two nodes willing to establish a route between them are 
assumed to have a joint shared secret key, distributed using the underlying key-management protocol. 
Finally we assume that there are no malicious nodes during the setup phase of the network. We assume a 
none-mobile dynamic topology sensor network, i.e. the nodes do not move but the roles they play in the 
network (e.g. sensing role, cluster head, control node, data aggregator …) are changed. 
Attack Model: A full cooperative Byzantine attack model is considered in which compromised nodes 
can collude to do whatever they can to subvert the functionality of the routing protocol. A node only 
trusts itself and the main base station. 
3.1 Neighbor Detection 
Neighborhood detection can be achieved through multiple ways: 
Centralized information from the base station that knows the topology of the network and keeps 
updating that topology in mobile networks. This can be amortized with protocols that introduce control 
nodes or cluster heads for scalability and efficiency. 
Naïve detection by broadcasting a HELLO packet. But this method is vulnerable to wormhole attacks 
where powerful compromised nodes can fool other nodes to believe that they are neighbors even though 
they may be multiple hops away. Wormhole prevention techniques can be used to prevent this attack  [36]. 
Directional-antenna-based neighborhood detection which is used as well to prevent Wormhole 
attacks  [36]. 
Propagation delay neighborhood detection techniques where packet delay of certain control packets is 
used to measure the distance to a neighbor  [37]. 
Under the assumptions that we consider, the neighborhood discovery is done only once at the setup 
phase and is guaranteed to be secure. So we will use the second method to establish the neighbor list of 
each node, which will be simple and safe since it is built at the time when no malicious nodes are 
assumed to exist. SRPS however, could be easily extended to dynamic and mobile networks if it is 
augmented with one of the other three neighbor detection techniques mentioned above ( 0,  0, and  0).  
After the node gets the list of its direct neighbor, it exchanges this list with each neighbor so that each 
node stores its direct neighbors and the neighbors of each neighbor. 
3.2 Initial Setup 
As soon as the sensor nodes are spread in the field, each node starts sending a HELLO message which 
is replied to by all the nodes that hear it. Both the HELLO packet and its reply are small packets that 
contain only the address of the packet initiator. For each reply to the HELLO packet, the initiator of the 
HELLO packet adds the source of the reply to its neighbor list. This processes is performed only once in 
the whole lifetime of the sensor network, so the associated overhead is affordable. Upon completing, each 
sensor node i have a list of its neighbors, which we denote by Ri. 
In addition to the knowledge of the neighbors, each node needs a mechanism to authenticate each one 
of them. To achieve this, each sensor node, say S, distributes a commitment key to every node in RS. This 
can be done in two ways. In the first, the commitment key is exchanged during the setup phase using the 
HELLO messages. Each HELLO massage is augmented with a commitment key (Kcommit(S)) from the 
sender (S) to each neighbor who stores the commitment before replying to the HELLO. In the second, the 
commitment key is exchanged using the underlying key management protocol. As a result, each node, say 
S, ends up having the commitments of its neighbors as well as its own commitment sequence seed 
(Kseed(S)).  
The commitment key is derived from the commitment seed as KCommit(S) = F(t) (Kseed(S)), where F is a 
one-way collision resistant function and t is the length of the commitment string. The value of t depends 
on the amount of available memory. It can be as small as two and as big as desired. However, the longer 
the sequence the lower the communication overhead incurred by commitment renewal (Section  3.4.3) and 
the larger the amount of memory required. So the tradeoff is between the communications overhead 
versus the storage requirement. To overcome the storage requirement, the commitment key can be derived 
on demand by applying the one-way function to the commitment seed (Kseed(A)) multiple times as needed. 
For example, the jth authentication key = F(t-j) (). So the tradeoff becomes between the memory 
requirement and the computational cost.  
When a node B wants to broadcast an authentic packet to its neighbors, it first generates the next 
authentication key as Kauth(B) = F(last known authentication key), and uses it to generate a MAC over the 
packet. The first authentication key = F (Kseed(S)). B then broadcasts the packet to its neighbors. After all 
the neighbors got the packet, B broadcasts its current authentication key, Kauth(B), that is used to 
authenticate the previously sent packet. When B releases Kauth(B), each neighbor, say A, verifies the 
validity of the key by running the hash function over it and comparing the result with the stored 
commitment for B. If the key is valid, A stores it as the new commitment for B and uses it to verify the 
authenticity of the packet it received from B. 
An alternative neighbor authentication could be achieved if we assume that the hardware addresses 
can’t be controlled by the attacker. If we set the ID of each node to be the hash value of the hardware 
address (IDX = F(Hardware_address_of X)), then a neighbor node can find the ID of the source of the 
packet by calculating it from the hardware address of the source. This also has the benefit of smaller 
packet overhead since the ID of the source of the packet need not to be included in the packet header. 
3.3 Route Discovery 
When a node, say S, needs to discover a route to a destination, say D, it generates a route discovery 
packet (RDP) that contains: a flag to indicate that it is a route request packet (REQ), the sender ID (IDS), 
the destination ID (IDD), a unique sequence number (SN), and a sequence number verification (SNV), see 
Section  3.4.1 for the generation of SN and SNV. S then calculates a MAC value over the packet using the 
shared key between S and D (KSD). S then calculates the neighborhood MAC using its current 
neighborhood authentication key Kauth(S). Finally, S broadcasts the packet to its neighbors. 
S  generates: RDP = REQ || IDS || IDD || SN || SNV 
S  calculates: MACKSD(RDP) 
S  calculates: MACKauth(S) (RDP|| MACKSD(RDP)) 
S  Broadcast: RDP || MACKSD(RDP) || MACKauth(S) (RDP|| MACKSD(RDP)) 
Each neighbor of S receives the broadcast and stores it for verification. S then broadcasts Kauth(S) to its 
neighbors. Each neighbor verifies the authenticity of Kauth(S) by calculating F(Kauth(S)) and comparing it 
with the stored commitment for S. If Kauth(S) passes the check, it is used to verify the integrity of the 
previously received packet by calculating the MAC value MACKauth(S)(RDP||MACKSD(RDP)) and 
comparing it with the MAC value associated with the packet, and Kauth(S) replaces the old commitment 
key. A node B in RS waits for a random time, Tr, selected from [Tmin, Tmax], during this time it collects 
every route broadcast it could hear from a different neighbor. When Tr runs out or when a certain number 
of requests, Nr, is collected, whichever occurs first, B selects at random one of the requests it has in its 
buffer and suppresses the rest. Assume without loss of generality that B selects the one it heard from S. B 
then removes the MACKauth(S) part of the message, appends its ID (IDB) and the ID of the node from which 
it receives the packet (IDS for B since it receives it directly from the source), appends its own 
authentication, and re-broadcasts the packet to its neighbors. The process continues the same way until 
the packet reaches the destination R.  
B  stores: RDP || MACKSD(RDP) || MACKauth(S) (RDP|| MACKSD(RDP)) 
S  broadcasts: Kauth(S) 
B  keeps in its buffer: IDS, IDD, SN, SNV, the ID of the node from which it receives the packet, and the 
ID of the second-hop previous sender of the packet. 
B  waits for Tr during which it repeats the previous step for every received broadcast. 
B  selects at random one of the packets in its buffer 
B  broadcasts: RDP || MACKSD(RDP) || IDB || IDS || MACKauth(B) (RDP|| MACKSD(RDP) ||  IDB || IDS) 
When D receives the packet, it verifies the authenticity of the source using the shared key KSD. Then 
D generates a route reply packet RRP that contains: a flag to indicate that it is a route reply packet (REP), 
the sender ID (IDS), the destination ID (IDD), a SN and a SNV. D then calculates a MAC value over the 
packet using the shared key between S and R (KSR). Finally D calculates the neighborhood MAC using its 
current neighbor commitment key (Kauth(D)). And if A is the node from which D receives the 
corresponding route request which received it from C, D sends the route reply packet back to A to be 
forwarded to C. 
A  broadcasts: RDP || MACKSD(RDP) || IDA || IDC || MACKauth(A) (RDP|| MACKSD(RDP) ||  IDA || IDC) 
D generates: RRP = REP || IDS || IDR || SN || SNV 
D  calculates: MACKSD(RRP) 
D  calculates: MACKauth(D) (RRP|| MACKSD(RRP)) 
D  A: RRP || MACKSD(RRP) || MACKauth(D) (RRP|| MACKSD(RRP)) 
Node A stores the route reply packet it received from D. D then broadcasts the commitment key 
Kauth(D). Each node in the neighborhood of D, DR, verifies Kauth(D) and updates the commitment of D they 
already have. A then uses Kauth(D) to verify the integrity of the route reply by calculating the MAC and 
comparing it with the MAC associated with the packet. A verifies the authenticity of the route reply and 
the route request, Section  3.4.1. If the request-reply pair passes the verification, A updates its routing 
table to S and to D. A then removes the MACKauth(D) part of the message, appends its ID, appends the ID 
of the second-way hop, C, that the reply should be forward to, associates its own authentication, and 
sends the packet back to C. The process continues the same way until the reply reaches the source S. S 
verifies the authenticity of the reply using the shared key between S and D (KDS) and updates its routing 
table to the destination. 
A  stores: RRP || MACKSD(RRP) || MACKauth(D) (RRP|| MACKSD(RRP)). 
D  broadcasts: Kauth(D). 
A  verifies the request-reply pair (Section  3.4.1). 
A  updates its routing table to S an D. 
A  C: RRP || MACKSD(RRP) || IDA || IDC || IDD || MACKauth(A)(RRP|| MACKSR(RRP) || IDA || IDC|| IDD). 
 
3.4 Intermediate Node Verification  
Since the route discovery is achieved by flooding, a mechanism is required to limit the amount of 
flooding through the network. Each node only needs to broadcast the same request only once and it must 
suppress any further request copies. This can be achieved by attaching a unique identifier in the header of 
each new route request from a certain node. The identifier is also required to distinguish new requests 
from old replayed ones.  SRPS uses a novel idea for the identifier to achieve intermediate node 
authentication of the route request and the route reply through a practical light weight protocol that 
prevents a malicious node from including itself in an already established routes. 
3.4.1 Request-Reply Verification 
Let SN be an increasing unique sequence number that is incremented with every new route request 
issued by a node. Let S be the route request source, D be the route request destination, and X be an 
intermediate node between S and D, which hears the route request from the intermediate node Y.  Let N 
be the length of the hash sequence, and F represents the hash function. 
3.4.1.1 The First Route Request 
The route request initiator (A): 
1. Computes 0 [ ]SDKv E SN=  as the seed for the hash sequence 
2. Computes the hash sequence { }0 1 2, , ,..., nv v v v  where 1( )i iv F v −= . 
3. Broadcasts the route request holding SN and SNV = “ ||nv n .”  
An intermediate node (B): 
1. Stores: , nSN v  in addition to the information explained in Section 3.3. 
The route request destination (D): 
5. Computes 0 [ ]SDKv E SN=  as the seed for the hash sequence 
6. Computes the hash sequence { }0 1 2, , ,..., nv v v v  where 1( )i iv F v −= . 
7. Sends back to S holding the same SN and SNV = 1nv −  
An intermediate node (B): 
4. Verifies that 1( )n nv F v −= , and replaces nv  with 1nv −  
5. Sets the route table to S and D 
So if the MAC values associated with the route request and the route reply and the hash values are 
verified to be correct, each intermediate node stores 1nv −  as a commitment for future route requests 
between S and D. The next RDP from S will carry 2nv −  and the corresponding RRP will carry 3nv − . A 
malicious node will not be able to compute 2nv −  or 3nv −  thus it will not be able to convince any of the 
nodes in the route to include itself in the route. In general the ith route request will follow the following 
protocol. 
3.4.1.2 The ith Route Request 
The route request initiator (A): 
1. Broadcasts a route request holding the current sequence number SN and a 
SNV= 2( 1) || 2( 1)n iv n i− − − −  
An intermediate node (B): 
2. Stores: 2( 1), n iSN v − −  in addition to the information explained in Section 3.3. 
The route request destination (D): 
3. Sends back to S a route reply holding SN and 2( 1) 1n iSNV v − − −= . 
An intermediate node (B): 
4. Verifies that 2 1 2( 1) 1( )n i n iv F v− − − − −=  and replaces 2 1n iv − −  with 2( 1) 1n iv − − −  
5. Sets the route table to S and D 
However, a DoS attack could be launched by colluding malicious nodes, to prevent S and D from 
establishing routes between them. A simple example of this attack is given in Figure 2.  Let M1 and M2 be 
two malicious nodes, and S and D have not yet initialized a route path between them. M1 could 
impersonate S and broadcasts an RDP packet claiming that it is from S. On the other end M2 impersonates 
D and replied with a legitimate RRP. When S and D tries to establish a route between them, any node 
which is part of the fake route (the route between M1 and M2) will drop the request because it will not be 
authentic.  
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Figure 2: DoS avoidance and Detection launched by impersonation  
Three different solutions to prevent this DoS attack. The first method is through prevention by not 
allowing ID spoofing, so no malicious node will be able to impersonate another node; ID spoofing 
prevention is explained in Section  4. The second method is by requiring the source of the initial route 
request to be authenticated individually by each node in the route. This can be achieved by modifying the 
Initial Route Request protocol as follow: 
3.4.2 First Route Request Version II 
The route request initiator (A): 
1. Computes 0 [ ]SDKv E SN=  as the seed for the hash sequence 
2. Computes the hash sequence { }0 1 2, , ,..., nv v v v  where 1( )i iv F v −= . 
3. Broadcasts the route request holding SN and SNV = “ ||nv n .”  
An intermediate node (B): 
4. Stores: , nSN v  in addition to the information explained in Section 3.3. 
The route request destination (D): 
5. Computes 0 [ ]SDKv E SN=  as the seed for the hash sequence 
6. Computes the hash sequence { }0 1 2, , ,..., nv v v v  where 1( )i iv F v −= . 
7. Sends back to S a route reply holding SN and  1nSNV v −=  
An intermediate node (B): 
8. Verifies that 1( )n nv F v −=  and replaces nv  with 1nv − . 
9. Generates a random number rB 
10. Sends to S with the route reply “ [ , , ]
SBk B
E B S r ” 
The route request initiator (A): 
11. Sends back to B “ [ , , 1]
SBk B
E B S r + ” 
An intermediate node (B): 
12. Sets the path to S and D if the reply of S is valid. 
The third method to countermeasure the DoS attack is on-demand detection and a voidance. Let B be 
an intermediate node that rejects the legitimate route request of S due to the earlier established fake route 
by M1. When S gets the route request from S, it rejects the request and sends a challenge back to S as 
“ [ , , ]
SBk B
E B S r ”, S will reply back by “ [ , , 1]
SBk B
E B S r + ”. Thus B will accept the request and broadcast 
it. At the same time B will send back to S, the previous two hops towards the source of the fake route and 
the next hop towards the fake destination. S uses these links to trace the initiator of the fake route and thus 
detect it. 
A final issue is the renewal of the hash sequence when the current sequence runs out. The following 
protocol is used to connect the hash sequence { }0 1 2, , ,..., nu u u u  with the current sequence 
{ }0 1 2, , ,..., nv v v v  assuming that 3v  is the last disclosed key: 
3.4.3 Hash Sequence Renewal Protocol 
Let S be the route request source, D the route request destination, and B an intermediate node in the 
path between S and D. 
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3.5 Neighbor monitoring 
Each sensor node performs a neighbor watch by placing itself in the promiscuous mode and observes 
the header of the packets sent out by its neighbors. Figure 3 illustrates the concept of neighbor monitoring 
in which node S sends a packet P destined to node D.  The packet P reaches node X in the path from the 
previous hop B. X must forward the packet to A, which must send it to D. When X forwards the packet, 
any one of the nodes M, N, and A will got it if that node does not have a collision.  
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Figure 3: An example of neighbor watch 
All the nodes that have both the sender and the receiver as neighbors are called the guards of the link 
between the sender and the receiver. In Figure 3, Nodes M, N, and X are guards for the link between X 
and A. Each guard of the link adds the packet information from the header of P in its watch buffer and 
time stamps it. The receiver, A, must forward the packet within a certain time threshold that depends on 
the density of the nodes, the bandwidth, and the traffic density. If a guard does not hear node A 
transmitting the packet within the time threshold, it will accuse A as performing a packet drop. If a guard 
hears node A transmitting the packet within the time threshold but detects a change in the packet content 
or header, it will accuse A as performing a packet forge or change. If a guard hears node A transmitting 
the packet, claiming that it got it from A, but they don’t have the corresponding packet information, from 
the packet sent by X, in their watch buffer, they will accuse node A as performing packet fabricating or at 
least packet delaying. 
3.6 Secure Disjoint Multi-path Discovery  
Multipath protocols which look for maximally disjoint paths  [49] are vulnerable to the tunneling 
attack which is a special case of the wormhole attack. In tunneling attack two malicious nodes collaborate 
to tunnel routing messages to one another so that a destination may falsely believes that two paths are 
disjoint while they share multiple nodes.  
To help establish disjoint routes to the destination we use an idea inspired by Hu et. al.  [37] which is 
used to prevent rushing attacks. In almost all the previously mentioned on demand ad-hoc and sensor 
network routing protocols, an intermediate node forwards the first announcement of a certain request and 
suppresses any following announcements. In SRPS, as we mentioned earlier, each node, say B, waits for a 
random a mount of time before forwarding the announcement that it heard. During that waiting time, it 
buffers all the announcements of the same request. At the same time, B listens to any neighbor, say E, 
whose timer times out and forwards one of the announcements he got, if that announcement comes from 
the same source as any one of those that B has in its buffer, then that announcement is suppressed from 
the buffer and is excluded from the random selection process done by B. Finally, when B’s counter time-
out, or when it gets a number of announcements greater than certain threshold value, it picks a random 
announcement from its buffer and forwards it.  
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Figure 4: (a) Route Request Collection at B and E; (b) E and B Forward the First Route Request 
they Get from X; (C) E and B Randomly Broadcast a Route Request. 
An example is shown in Figure 4 , let B receives route requests from nodes X, Y, and Z, and let E is a 
neighbor of B who also receives from X, and let the route request from X is the first to arrive to both B 
and E, Figure 4(a). If nodes B and E forward the first route request they got and drop the others they both 
will forward the route request they got from X as shown in Figure 4(b) which results in joint paths in 
node X. However, using the our technique, assuming that the timer of E runs out before that of B and that 
E broadcasts the message it received from X, then B will drop the X’s packet. When B’s timer runs out, it 
selects at random one of the Y, and Z packets and broadcasts it. The result paths are disjoint as shown in 
Figure 4(c). 
When an intermediate node, say B, receives more than one reply for the same route discovery, which 
happens when two none-neighbor nodes forward the route request from the same previous hop. Consider 
for example the scenario shown in Figure 5. Node B had forwarded the route request it got from node A. 
Both of the none-neighbor nodes X and Y received and forwarded the route request they got from B. 
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Figure 5: Route Reply Behavior of an Intermediate Node 
As shown in Figure 5, B got a route reply back from both X and Y, assume that the X’s route reply 
arrive first. Four different scenarios occur when B got the second route reply, Y’s route reply, based on 
the behavior of B. (i) if B is an honest node, it will drop the second route reply, (ii) if B is malicious and 
A is an honest node, even if B forwards the second route reply to A, in attempt to include itself in both 
routes, A will drop it, (iii) if B is malicious and A  is malicious, and B forwards the route reply to A, this 
moves us recursively to step (i) where node A takes the role of node B, and the next hop from A plays the 
role of node A, (iv) if B is malicious and it forwards the second route reply to another node, say α, B will 
succeed in including it self in two “different routes”.  To countermeasure this attack, we use the neighbor 
watch. When a node, say β, overhears a neighbor forwarding a route reply it will save the route reply 
information in its watch buffer for a certain time τ. If α overhears the same neighbor, B, forwarding the 
same route reply again within τ, it will accuse that neighbor as trying to include himself in multiple 
disjoint routes, and thus delete any routing entry it may have between the source and destination that 
includes B. Thus in Figure 5, node A upon overhearing node B forwarding the next route reply will delete 
the first route reply from its routing table and thus preventing B from being in two routes. τ is selected to 
be the same as the threshold time after which the initiator of the route request will no longer accept any 
new route replies. 
The initiator of the route discovery gives a priority level for each route reply it receives; the priority 
that we propose is based on the minimum delay. So the faster reply will be considered the highest priority 
one, even it may come through a relatively longer route (more number of hops). The rationale behind that 
is a longer route with less congestion or less malicious behavior is better than a shorter and congested 
route. 
 
3.7 Route Maintenance  
If an already established route between the source, S, and the destination, D, is broken either 
naturally; e.g. a node on the route exhausted its power, or maliciously by a compromised node in the path 
dropping data packets, then S has three options. The first is to revert to an alternate disjoint route if it has 
one. The second is to initiate a new route discovery process. The third is to ask the nodes at the edges of 
the faulty link to handle the problem and discover alternate routes to pass the traffic between them. For 
example if the route contains S-B- ~~~~ -X-Y-Z-~~~-R, and if Y is the faulty node, then S asks X to find 
an alternate route to Z and ask both X and Z to update their routing tables to S and D accordingly. 
The ability of S to discover the broken path depends on the nature of the connection between S and D. 
If S is used to receive an acknowledgment through this route it will notice the problem by failing to 
receive the appropriate acknowledgments. If D expects to receive data from S and that data did not arrive, 
D may request the data from S through a different route since it may guess the problem. If neighbor 
monitoring (Section  3.5) of data packet is enabled, the guards of the broken link will detect the failure and 
report it to S. 
4 Security Analysis 
In this section we will show how SRPS mitigates known attacks against the routing infrastructure. 
Conjecture: SRPS route discovery does not allow any route to be established through a wormhole, 
Sybil, Sinkhole, rushing, or HELLO flood attacks.  
 
Conjecture#1: SRPS does not allow any alteration, or replaying of route information 
Proof:  The route request and the route reply are both authenticated by the source and the destination 
of the route using a shared key known only to them. No malicious node can generate or change a valid 
route request that can be accepted by the destination, and no malicious node can generate or change a 
route reply that can be accepted by the initiator of the corresponding route request. The increasing 
sequence number associated with each route request-reply pair prevents replaying of old route requests 
and replies. The intermediate node verification prevents any number of colluding malicious nodes from 
including a malicious node in an already established route using the SN and the SNV as explained in 
Section  3.4.  
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Figure 6: An Example of a Malicious Node Trying to Include Itself in an Established Route. 
For example, assume a path is established between A and B as shown in Figure 6. Let M be a 
malicious node that tries to include itself in this path. For M to be able to do so it must convince X to 
change its routing table to point to M for packet destined to B, and convince A to change its routing table 
to point to M for packet destined to A. So M has to generate a valid route request or replay an old request, 
other wise the intermediate nodes will ignore the request since it will not be correctly verified. If M 
replays an old route request, the target B will discover that through the old sequence number that it holds 
and thus ignore the request so X and A will not receive a reply and thus will not update their routing 
tables. For M to generate a valid request it must know the key shared between A and B, which is provably 
infeasible unless either A or B or both are compromised, in that case there is no need even to try this 
attack. M as well may try to offer a faster service to A by claiming that it is one hop away from B, may be 
by using a high power transmission, but neither A nor B will believe it because it is not in the neighbor 
list of either of them. 
Conjecture#2: SRPS does not allow any malicious node to establish a Sinkhole. 
Proof:  In a Sinkhole, an attacker tries to attract all the traffic from a particular area through a 
malicious node by including the malicious node in the route to all nodes in that area. If succeeded, the 
attacker can launch other attacks such as blackhole (blocking) or selective forwarding of data traffic. This 
attack typically works by making the malicious node look especially attractive for the surrounding nodes. 
For example an attacker could replay or spoof a high quality route to the destination. Some 
countermeasures of this attack rely on an end-to-end acknowledgments containing reliability or latency 
information. However, a powerful attacker who has enough power to transmit the packet directly to the 
target could easily defeat these countermeasures. 
SRPS is not vulnerable to the sinkhole attack, due to the local knowledge of each node and due to 
intermediate node verification. A malicious node can’t interact with any non-neighbor node; the malicious 
node communication will be rejected because it is not a neighbor node. This means that a malicious node 
can’t shout loudly to convince far nodes that they are only one hop a way from it and thus attracting their 
traffic to it. Also a malicious node can’t include it self in an established route or spoof or alter or replay 
any route information as proved in conjecture#1. 
Conjecture#3: SRPS does not allow any malicious node to spoof routing information. 
Proof:  a malicious node, say M, has two possibilities to be able to spoof routing information; (i) 
generate the routing information and claim the ID of the victim node, say S. Any neighbor of M that does 
not have S as a neighbor will automatically reject the spoofed data. Any neighbor of M that is also a 
neighbor of S will also reject the data since it will not be verified correctly using the neighborhood 
authentication mechanism introduced in Section  3.2. (ii) Generate the routing information and claim that 
it has received it from S through another node, say B. If B is not a neighbor to M, then all the neighbors 
of M will automatically reject the spoofed data. If B is a neighbor to M, then the guards of the link 
between M and be will detect the forge since they do not have the corresponding data (from B to M) in 
their watching buffer. 
Conjecture#4: SRPS does not allow any malicious node to launch a Sybil attack for routing purposes. 
Proof:  In Sybil attack, a malicious node presents multiple identities to the network  [22]. This attack 
is especially destructive for protocols that are used to discover disjoint multiple routes; a malicious node 
can include itself in multiple different routes by presenting different identities to other nodes. As proved 
in Conjecture#3, SRPS prevents ID spoofing, so no malicious node can present an identity other than its 
own to the network and thus can’t launch the Sybil attack.  
Conjecture#5: SRPS does not allow any colluding malicious nodes to launch a Wormhole attack. 
Proof:  The wormhole attack  [35], [48] [35] involves two distant colluding malicious nodes to 
understate their distance from each other. It is more effective when used to create sinkholes or artificial 
links that attract traffic. This attack can be launched either by using an out-of-bound channel available 
only to the attacker or by tunneling messages received in one part of the network and replaying them in a 
different part. It is so effective that it can be launched even without having access to any cryptographic 
keys. 
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Figure 7: Wormhole illustration example 
 
SRPS detects and defeats the wormhole attack; neighborhood authentication (Section  3.2) defeats the 
possibility of launching the attack by nodes that does not have cryptographic keys. So for this attack to 
work in SRPS, the two colluding nodes must be compromised nodes owning legitimate cryptographic 
keys. We consider the scenarios by which wormhole attack could be launched. Two colluding nodes use 
an out-of-band invisible channel to the underlying sensors or packet encapsulation to tunnel routing 
information between them, Figure 7. When M1 hears the route request packet initiated by S, it directs it to 
M2. M2 rebroadcasts the packet to its neighbors and eventually it reaches the target D. D then generates a 
route reply and sends it back until it reaches M2. M2 sends the route reply back to M1 using the unseen 
channel between them. M1 forwards the route reply back to S and it must append to the header the ID of 
the previous hop from which it got the route reply. M1 has two choices, either to say the truth and append 
the ID of M2 as the previous hop or lie and append the ID of one of its neighbors, say Z, as the previous 
hop. In the first choice node S will reject the route reply because it knows that M2 is not a neighbor to M1, 
so M2 can’t be the previous hop from M1, also all the neighbors of M1 will detect the malicious activity of 
M1. In the second case, all the guards of the link between Z and M1 (Z,α, and β) will detect B as forging 
the route reply since they don’t have the corresponding information from Z in their watch buffer. So in 
both cases M1 will fail to pass the route reply and thus the wormhole will not succeed. 
Conjecture#6: SRPS prevents rushing attacks. 
Proof:  In the rushing attack, an adversary who hears the route request broadcast rushes to 
rebroadcast the request in attempt to make the route request broadcasted by him the first to reach all the 
neighbors of the destination. If the attacker succeeds in doing that, then any route discovered by this route 
discovery will include a hop through the attacker. As a result the attacker can easily launch a DOS attack 
and prevent the source from discovering any usable routes to the destination. 
SRPS inherently implement and use rushing attack prevention (RAP)  [37] for discovery of multiple 
disjoint routes, Section  3.6. An intermediate node will not forward the first route request it got (may be 
from a rushing malicious  node), but it will collect a number of route requests from different neighbors 
and randomly select one of them to rebroadcast. 
5 SRPS analysis 
5.1 Coverage analysis 
In this Section, we characterize the probability of miss detection and false detection as the network 
density increases and the detection confidence index, γ, varies. Results provide some interesting insight. 
For example, we are able to compute the required network density d to detect p% of the attacks when the 
detection confidence index equals to γ.  
Consider any two randomly selected neighbor nodes, S and D, as shown in the Figure 8(a). S and D 
are separated by a distance x, and the communication range is r.  The guard nodes for the communication 
between S and D are those nodes that lie within the communication range of S and D, the shaded area in 
Figure 8(a). The area of the shaded region in Figure 8(a) is given 
by ( )
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Figure 8: (a) The area from which a node can guard the link between S and D; (b) Illustration of 
detection accuracy 
The minimum value of the Area(x), Areamin, is when x = r. The minimum number of guards, gmin, 
which can watch the link between S and D is given by
2
min min 0.36g Area d r d= = , 
where min ( )Area Area r= . The expected number of guards, g, which can watch the link between S and D 
is given by ( )2 2[ ( )] 3 3g E Area x d r d r d= = = . The number of neighbors of a node is given 
by 2NB r dπ= , thus, 3 0.55g NB NB
π
= ≈ . 
Based on the performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol  [51], we assume that each 
packet collides with constant and independent probability, PC, i.e. PC is the probability of a collision seen 
by a packet being transmitted on the channel. Thus, each guard receives a packet with 
probability 1 CPα = − . Assume that µ malicious activities occur within a certain time window, T. Assume 
that a guard must detect β malicious activities to cause the MalC for a node to cross the threshold, and 
thus, generates an alert. Then, the alert probability at a guard is given by ( )| 1
ii
i
P
i
µ
µ
β µ
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=
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The probability that at least γ of the guards generate an alert, and thus detect the malicious node is given 
by 
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Where  ( , 1)B gγ γ− +  is the Beta function and |( ; , 1)B P gβ µ γ γ− +  is the incomplete Beta function. 
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Figure 9: (a) Probability of wormhole detection as a function of the number of neighbors; (b) 
Probability of false alarm as a function of the number of neighbors 
Figure 9(a) shows the probability of detecting the wormhole using µ = 7, β=5, γ =3, and PC = 0.05 
when the number of neighbors is 3, and the number of compromised nodes M = 2. PC is assumed to 
increase linearly with the number of neighbors.  Since the number of guards increases as the number of 
neighbors increases, the probability of detection increases since it becomes easier to get the degree of 
confidence required. However, the collision probability also increases as the number of neighbors 
increases, and thus the probability of detection starts to fall rapidly beyond a point. Figure 12, shows for 
the same µ, β, and PC the probability of wormhole detection as a function of γ when NB = 15 and M = 2. 
As the detection confidence index increases, the probability of detection decreases. 
As shown in Figure 8(b), a guard G will not detect a fabricated packet sent by D, claiming it was 
received from S, if G experienced a collision at the time when D transmits, thus, the probability of 
misdetection is given by 1MD CP Pα= = − . A false alarm occurs when D receives a packet sent from S, 
while G does not receive that packet, and later, G receives the corresponding packet forwarded by D. 
Thus, the probability of false alarm, PFA, is given by 2 2(1 ) (1 )FA C CP P P α α= − = − . Assume that S sends 
to D µ packets, to be forwarded by D, within a certain time window, T, then the probability that β or more 
of them are falsely detected is given by ( ) ( )( | ) 1
i i
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∑ , and the probability that γ or 
more guards send false alarms, leading to the node being flagged malicious, is given by  
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Figure 9(b) shows the probability of false alarm as a function of the number of nodes for the same 
parameters as in Figure 9(a). The non monotonic nature of the plot can be explained as follows. As the 
number of neighbors increases, so does the number of guards. Initially, this increases the probability that 
at least γ will miss the packet from S to the guard but not from D to the guard, leading to false detection at 
these γ guards. But beyond a point, the number of neighbors causes increased contention leading to the 
probability that both these packets will be missed at the guard and will thus not lead to false detection. 
The worst case false alarm probability is negligible (less than 0.3×10-6). 
 
5.2 Cost Analysis 
In this section we analyze the resource requirements (memory, computation, and communication) of 
SRPS. To compare and judge these requirements we mention the resources available to one of the most 
common sensor nodes, the MICA motes. This mote has Atmega128 4 MHZ processor, 4 K byte RAM,  
128 K byte flash memory (program memory), 512 K byte nonvolatile memory and  38Kbps bandwidth. 
5.2.1 Memory Cost 
Each node needs to store the list of neighbors, the neighbors of each neighbor, a commitment key for 
each neighbor, a commitment string for itself, a routing table, and a watch buffer. The number of 
neighbors, Nn, depends on the density of the network.. The length of the commitment string, Lc, depends 
on the available storage and it can be as small as two elements and as large as desired. The more elements 
in the string, the less communication overhead required for commitment renewal. The size of the routing 
table depends on the number of routing table entries, RTE, and the size of each entry. Each routing table 
entry consists of the final target identity, the neighbor identity that leads to the destination, and the 
sequence number of the route request that builds the route entry. The watch buffer size depends on the 
number of buffer entries, NBE, and the size of each entry. Each watch buffer entry consists of 4-node 
identities (one for the source, one for the target, and 2 for the previous two hops), an SN, and an SNV. For 
example, let the identity size = 4 bytes, the MAC size = 10 bytes, the key size = 8 bytes, the SN = 4 bytes, 
SNV = 10 bytes, then the required storage will be Nn (4 + 8) = 12Nn bytes for the neighbor list, 64 Lc for 
the commitment string, RTE (4+4+4) = 12RTE, and NBE(4+4+4+4+4+10) = 30NBE. The total amount of 
memory required = 12 Nn + 64 Lc + 12 RTE + 30 NBE bytes. If Nn =20, Lc = 10, RTE = 20, and NBE = 
10, then the memory requirement will be 1420 byte which is less than 1.5 kilobytes. 
5.2.2 Computational Cost  
The initiator needs to calculate three MAC values; one for end-to-end verification for the target to 
verify the authenticity of the source using the shared key between the source and the destination, another 
is used for neighborhood authentication using the current commitment key, the other is used calculate the 
RSN using the shared key between the source and the destination over the current sequence number. The 
initiator also calculates a HASH value to find SNV. And another HASH value to generate the next 
commitment key. Each intermediate node needs to verify the commitment key (one HASH) calculation, 
verify the neighborhood authenticity of the packet (one MAC calculation), calculate the next commitment 
key (one hash calculation),  authenticate the packet (one MAC), and if the intermediate node is in the path 
of the route reply then that intermediate node needs to verify the request-reply pair (one HASH). The 
destination needs to verify the source (one MAC), the neighbor hood (one MAC), calculate the RSN (one 
MAC), sign the reply (one MAC), calculate the next commitment key (one HASH) sign the packet for its 
neighbors verification (one MAC). So the source needs to calculate 3 MAC values and 2 hash values. The 
intermediate node needs to calculate 2 MAC values and 3 hash values. And the destination needs to 
calculate 5 MAC and 1 HASH values. The following table provides the overhead required by some 
cryptographic algorithms [47]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 RC4 RC5 AES 
5 Rounds 12 Rounds 
Speed (128bits/ms) 1.299 5.471 12.475 102.483 
Data size (Bytes) 258 68 124 1165 
Code size (bytes) 580 1436 1436 9492 
Table 1: Cryptographic algorithms costs 
5.2.3 Communication Cost 
The source node needs to broadcast the RDP and the key commitment packet. Each intermediate node 
needs to transmit the same amount of traffic as the source node. The destination needs to transmit the 
RRP and the commitment key, and each intermediate node in the route to the source needs to transmit the 
same amount of traffic. The size of the RDP packet = 4 (source ID) + 4 (destination ID) + 4 (previous hop 
ID) + 1 (flag) + 4 (SN) + 10 SVN + 10 (end-to-end MAC) + 10 (neighbor MAC) = 47 bytes. The 
commitment key packet size = 4 (sender ID) + 8 (the key) = 12 bytes. The RRP packet size = 4 (source 
ID) + 4 (destination ID) + 10 (RSN =18 bytes). 
6 Simulation Results 
We use the ns-2 simulation environment to simulate a data exchange protocol, individually in the 
baseline case without any protection, and also with SRPS. We distribute the nodes randomly over a square 
sensor field with a fixed average node density. Thus, the sensor field size varies (80×80 m to 204×204 m) 
with the number of nodes. We assume that the route is evicted from the cache after a timeout period 
expires (TOutRoute). We simulate the wormhole attack and study its consequences on the network with 
SRPS and without SRPS. When a malicious node hears a route request, it directs the request to all the other 
malicious nodes in the network using an out-of-band channel or using packet encapsulation. For packet 
encapsulation, we assume that the colluding nodes always have a route between them. We simulate the 
Wormhole attack. We simulate the out-of-band channel by letting the compromised nodes deliver the 
packets instantaneously to their colluding parties. The wormhole attack exercises the principal features of 
SRPS, namely, local monitoring and are more difficult to mitigate than other attacks. Hence, we simulate 
it in preference to other attacks. After a wormhole is established, the nodes drop any data packet going 
over that wormhole.  
Each node acts as a data source and generates data using an exponential random distribution with 
inter-arrival rate of µ. The destination is chosen at random and is changed using an exponential random 
distribution with rate ξ. The important input parameters to the simulation are the detection confidence 
index (γ), the number of neighbors for each node (NB), which is a function of the node density, the 
number of nodes in the network (N), and the number of compromised nodes (M). The output parameters 
include the isolation latency, the number of data packets generated, the number of data packet dropped 
due to the wormhole, the number of routes established, and the number of routes affected by the 
wormhole. The simulation also accounts for losses due to natural collisions. The isolation latency is 
calculated from the time a malicious node starts a wormhole attack until it is completely isolated by all of 
it neighbors. The guards inform all the neighbors of the detected malicious node through multiple 
unicasts. The output parameters that we present here are obtained by averaging over 30 runs. For each 
run, the malicious nodes are chosen at random such that they are more than 2 hops away from each other. 
Table 2 summarizes the range of input parameter values for the experiments conducted.  
Parameter Value Parameter Value Parameter Value 
Tx Range (r) 30 m γ 2-8 N 20,50,100,150 
NB 8 µ 1/10 sec ξ 1/200 sec 
TOutRoute 50 sec M 0-4 Channel bw 40 kbps 
β 5 τ 0.5 sec T 200 
Table 2: Input parameter values for SRPS simulations 
Figure 10 shows the number of packets dropped as a function of simulation time for the 100-node 
setup with 2 and 4 colluding nodes both with SRPS and without SRPS.  Since the number is vastly different 
in the two cases, they are shown on separate Y-axes, the axis on the left of each figure corresponds to the 
baseline case (without SRPS) and the axis to the right corresponds to the system using SRPS. In the 
baseline case, since wormholes are not detected and isolated, the cumulative number of packets dropped 
continues to increase steadily with time. But in the SRPS case, as wormholes are identified and isolated for 
good, the cumulative number stabilizes. Notice that the cumulative number of packets dropped grows for 
some time even after the wormhole is locally isolated, due to the cached routes that contain the wormhole 
and continue to be used till route timeout occurs.  
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Figure 10: The cumulative number of 
dropped packets with and without SRPS 
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Figure 11: Fraction of dropped packets and 
malicious routes with and without SRPS  
Figure 11 shows a snapshot, at the simulation time of 2000 secs, of the fraction of the total 
number of packets dropped to the total number of packets sent and the fraction of the total 
number of routes that involve the wormhole to the total number of routes established. This is 
shown for for 0-4 compromised nodes for both scenarios — with SRPS and without SRPS. With 0 
or 1 compromised node, there is no effect on normal traffic since no wormhole is created. Notice 
that the relationship between the number of dropped packets and the number of malicious routes 
is not linear. This is because the route established through the wormhole is more heavily used by 
data sources due to the aggressive nature of the malicious node at the end of the wormhole. If we 
track these same output parameters over time, with SRPS, they would tend to zero as no more 
malicious routes are established or packets dropped, while without SRPS they would reach a 
steady state as a fixed percentage of traffic continues to be affected by the undetected wormholes. 
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Figure 12: Detection probability and latency with variations in detection confidence 
index for SRPS 
Figure 12 bears out the analytical result (Figure 9) for the detection probability as the 
detection confidence index (γ) is varied with NB = 15 and M= 2.  We also show the isolation 
latency. As γ increases, the detection probability goes down due to the need for alarm reporting 
by a larger number of guards, in the presence of collisions. Also the isolation latency goes up, 
though it is very small (less than 30 s) even at the right end of the plot. 
 
7 Conclusion 
We have presented a secure routing protocol, called SRPS, for resource constrained sensor 
networks. SRPS represents a stand alone lightweight protocol that mitigates all the known attacks 
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namely, traffic blocking, HELLO flood, sinkhole, wormhole, Sybil, rushing, spoofed, altered, and 
replayed attacks. We present a detailed security analysis of SRPS and show its ability of dealing 
with each one of these attacks.  SRPS exploits novel ideas to achieve, in addition to the end-to-end 
authentication, an intermediate node verification using the specially generated sequence numbers 
and sequence number verifications.  Neighbor watch and wait-while-collect are used to help in 
defeating these attacks and establishing multiple disjoint routes. 
We present mathematical analysis of the detection coverage in SRPS, and the resource 
overhead that SRPS requires and show that these requirements are within the available limits for 
the current sensor technology. Finally we provide simulation results that show the capabilities of 
SRPS in mitigating the wormhole attack. 
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